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Keeping It Safe: Securing DICOM

Lawrence Tarbox, Ph.D.

Mallinckrodt Institute of Radiology Washington University in St. Louis

Research Assistant Professor of Radiology St. Louis, Missouri, USA

WG-5, WG-10, WG-14 (Chair), WG-18, WG-23 (chair), WG-27



Mallinckrodt Institute of Radiology

Audience Participation



Time For A Quiz!




DICOM does not have any provisions for secure communication of images



Traffic on the Network






Protection against unauthorized network listeners by means of encryption

Traffic on the Network





Identifying the other system

Traffic on the Network



TLS encryption makes use of public internet connections safe.

- This will need to be explained to security staff.
- DICOM over TLS is like HTTPS and should be allowed.

Node Authentication uses can be extensively customized.

- Each connection can be verified in detail, or connections just checked to ensure that they are all within facility connections.
- DICOM enables a very wide variety of authentication and access control policies.
- DICOM does not mandate any particular policies.



DICOM does not have any provisions for securely communicating user credentials



User Credentialing



- Option 1: Trust the sender
 - Mutual TLS authentication
- Option 2: Assertions during association negotiation
 - SAML
 - Kerberos



Facilitates audit logging

Step toward cross-system authorization and access controls

- DICOM still leaves access control in the hands of the application
- **Query Filtering**
- For productivity as well as security



Independent of other security mechanisms

No changes to other DICOM security mechanisms

Avoid incompatibility with the installed base

Minimum of changes to existing implementation libraries

Extensible for future credential types

Established during association negotiation

- before any regular DIMSE transactions take place
- Allows SCP to reject associations based on ID

Credential Type Profiles




Un-authenticated identity assertion

- Systems in a trusted environment
- Username plus passcode
- Systems in a secure network
- **Kerberos-based authentication**
- Strongest security
- **Generic SAML assertion**
- Nice mix of simplicity and security


Extended Negotiation Response Expected





Extended Negotiation No Response Expected







Could support any mechanism that supports uni-directional assertion mechanism (e.g. using PKI and Digital Signatures)

Does not support identity mechanisms that require bi-directional negotiation (e.g. Liberty Alliance proposals)



- User identity alone, with no other security mechanisms
- User identity plus the current DICOM TLS mechanism
- User identity plus future lower level transport mechanisms (e.g. IPv6 with security option)
- **User identity plus VPN**
- Practically any combination needed



DICOM does not have any provisions for guaranteeing the integrity of data.

FALSE

Embedded Security Features



Digital Signatures

- Persistent integrity check
- Identifies users or devices that handled the object, with optional secure timestamp


Selective Encryption

- Persistent privacy protection
- Hide sensitive Attributes from certain users

Digital Signatures

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- Embedded in SOP Instance
- Can make secure references to unsigned objects
- Multiple signatures
 - Overlapping subsets
 - Multiple signers
 - Signatures on individual items
- Signature purposes
- Defined in profiles





DICOM does not have standardized digital watermarking of images

TRUE, but ...

DICOM does not preclude its use



There is no embedded encryption defined by DICOM.





- Can encrypt all of the SOP Instance, selected attributes, or even just a single attribute
- Security Profiles are used to describe the attributes that are protected
- Local profiles can be used if selective encryption is wanted for special needs, e.g.,
- Only encrypt patient information, not equipment or image
- Only encrypt report contents, not patient identification

SOP Instance Attributes (unencrypted)	Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine
Encrypted Attributes Sequence	
Item 1 (of n) Encrypted Content Transfer Syntax Encrypted Content CMS attributes Syntax envelope encrypted Content Modified Attributes Sequence Item 1 (of only 1) Attributes to be encrypted	
Item 2 (of n) Encrypted Content Transfer Syntax Encrypted Content CMS envelope	
Item n (of n) Encrypted Content Transfer Syntax Encrypted Content	



- DICOM Media Security applies to all DICOM specified media, e.g., CD-R, DVD-R, E-Mail, USB Device
- The media's file system remain unencrypted, so the media can be processed and copied without special operating system driver
- The individual objects are held in CMS (Cryptographic Message Syntax) envelopes inside files on the media
- CMS is often used in secure e-mail
- Optional encryption to protect against unauthorized disclosure.
- Optional integrity check to protect against tampering



DICOM itself provides no mechanisms for controlling access to data


TRUE

Securing Access to Data



Access Control

- Get permission before allowing action
- Suitable for certain situations, e.g. restricting access to authorized medical staff



Audit Control

- Allow action without interference, trusting the judgment of the staff.
 - Monitor behavior to detect and correct errors.
- Both have a place in security systems
- Local security policies determine what is handled by access control, and what is handled by audit controls.



DICOM does not specify computer access control or other computer security measures.


- These are subject to local policy
- These are very application specific
- These are very implementation specific

DICOM does expect that the use of audit trails and activity monitoring will be part of the local security system.

DICOM defines a standard interface for reporting user and computer activity to a centralized audit repository.

On the Computer





The audit repository can be used to record and monitor the entire network.

The security detection mechanisms may be as simple as flagging a login failure, or be highly complex behavior pattern recognition. DICOM enables these mechanisms. DICOM does not specify them.

Configuring Network Security



Certificate Management

- Certificates are used to identify systems (and perhaps Application Entities)
- Certificates can be self-generated, facility signed, or signed by internationally recognized authorities.

Most equipment supports

- Individually provided certificates per system (self-signed or otherwise), and
- Certificates for facility authorities. Certificates signed by these authorities are recognized as authorized.

Management reference

• The SPC paper "Managing Certificates" describes this in more detail.

Configuring Network Security



Firewall rules

- Firewalls may need to be configured to permit DICOM over TLS traffic (in and out).
 - The DICOM over TLS port defaults to the same port as HTTPS, but it is often changed.
 - Using a different port permits the same system to be both an HTTPS server and a DICOM over TLS system.

Audit Policies

- DICOM makes no specific recommendations on how the DICOM audit logs should be analyzed.
- The audit logs are designed to support surveillance for unauthorized activity. Other more detailed system specific logs are expected to provide forensic detail.







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http://dicom.nema.org/



http://www.HL7.org/



http://www.IHE.net/



Lawrence Tarbox, Ph.D.

- tarboxl@mir.wustl.edu
- 510 South Kingshighway Boulevard St. Louis, MO 63110 USA

Thank you for your attention !