

# THE DICOM 2013 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE & SEMINAR

March 14-16

Bangalore, India



## Keeping It Safe: Securing DICOM

Lawrence Tarbox, Ph.D.

Mallinckrodt Institute of Radiology  
Washington University in St. Louis

Research Assistant Professor of Radiology  
St. Louis, Missouri, USA

WG-5, WG-10, WG-14 (Chair),  
WG-18, WG-23 (chair), WG-27




## Time For A Quiz!

**DICOM does not have any provisions  
for secure communication of images**


**FALSE**

# Traffic on the Network



Protection against unauthorized network listeners by means of encryption

# Traffic on the Network



Identifying the other system

**TLS encryption makes use of public internet connections safe.**

- This will need to be explained to security staff.
- DICOM over TLS is like HTTPS and should be allowed.

**Node Authentication uses can be extensively customized.**

- Each connection can be verified in detail, or connections just checked to ensure that they are all within facility connections.
- DICOM enables a very wide variety of authentication and access control policies.
- DICOM does not mandate any particular policies.

**DICOM does not have any provisions  
for securely communicating user  
credentials**

**FALSE**

- **Option 1: Trust the sender**
  - **Mutual TLS authentication**
- **Option 2: Assertions during association negotiation**
  - **SAML**
  - **Kerberos**



## **Facilitates audit logging**

## **Step toward cross-system authorization and access controls**

- **DICOM still leaves access control in the hands of the application**

## **Query Filtering**

- **For productivity as well as security**

## **Independent of other security mechanisms**

- **No changes to other DICOM security mechanisms**

## **Avoid incompatibility with the installed base**

- **Minimum of changes to existing implementation libraries**

## **Extensible for future credential types**

## **Established during association negotiation**

- **before any regular DIMSE transactions take place**
- **Allows SCP to reject associations based on ID**

## **Un-authenticated identity assertion**

- **Systems in a trusted environment**

## **Username plus passcode**

- **Systems in a secure network**

## **Kerberos-based authentication**


- **Strongest security**

## **Generic SAML assertion**

- **Nice mix of simplicity and security**


# Extended Negotiation

## Response Expected



# Extended Negotiation

No Response Expected



**Could support any mechanism that supports uni-directional assertion mechanism (e.g. using PKI and Digital Signatures)**

**Does not support identity mechanisms that require bi-directional negotiation (e.g. Liberty Alliance proposals)**

# Several Options

**User identity alone, with no other security mechanisms**

**User identity plus the current DICOM TLS mechanism**

**User identity plus future lower level transport mechanisms (e.g. IPv6 with security option)**

**User identity plus VPN**

***Practically any combination needed***

**DICOM does not have any provisions for guaranteeing the integrity of data.**

**FALSE**



## Digital Signatures


- **Persistent integrity check**
- **Identifies users or devices that handled the object, with optional secure timestamp**

## Selective Encryption

- **Persistent privacy protection**
- **Hide sensitive Attributes from certain users**

# Digital Signatures

- **Embedded in SOP Instance**
- **Can make secure references to unsigned objects**
- **Multiple signatures**
  - **Overlapping subsets**
  - **Multiple signers**
  - **Signatures on individual items**
- **Signature purposes**
- **Defined in profiles**



**DICOM does not have standardized  
digital watermarking of images**

**TRUE, but ...**

**DICOM does not preclude its use**

**There is no embedded encryption  
defined by DICOM.**

**FALSE**

**Can encrypt all of the SOP Instance, selected attributes, or even just a single attribute**

**Security Profiles are used to describe the attributes that are protected**

**Local profiles can be used if selective encryption is wanted for special needs, e.g.,**

- **Only encrypt patient information, not equipment or image**
- **Only encrypt report contents, not patient identification**

*SOP Instance*

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_


Attributes (unencrypted)

**Encrypted Attributes Sequence**

**Item 1 (of n)**

**Encrypted Content Transfer Syntax**

**Encrypted Content** \_\_\_\_\_



**Item 2 (of n)**

**Encrypted Content Transfer Syntax**

**Encrypted Content** \_\_\_\_\_



**Item n (of n)**

**Encrypted Content Transfer Syntax**

**Encrypted Content** \_\_\_\_\_



**DICOM Media Security applies to all DICOM specified media, e.g., CD-R, DVD-R, E-Mail, USB Device**

**The media's file system remain unencrypted, so the media can be processed and copied without special operating system driver**

**The individual objects are held in CMS (Cryptographic Message Syntax) envelopes inside files on the media**

- **CMS is often used in secure e-mail**
- **Optional encryption to protect against unauthorized disclosure.**
- **Optional integrity check to protect against tampering**


**DICOM itself provides no mechanisms  
for controlling access to data**

**TRUE**



- **Access Control**

- Get permission before allowing action
- Suitable for certain situations, e.g. restricting access to authorized medical staff



- **Audit Control**

- Allow action without interference, trusting the judgment of the staff.
- Monitor behavior to detect and correct errors.

- Both have a place in security systems
- Local security policies determine what is handled by access control, and what is handled by audit controls.


**DICOM does not specify computer access control or other computer security measures.**

- These are subject to local policy
- These are very application specific
- These are very implementation specific

**DICOM does expect that the use of audit trails and activity monitoring will be part of the local security system.**

**DICOM defines a standard interface for reporting user and computer activity to a centralized audit repository.**

# On the Computer



The audit repository can be used to record and monitor the entire network.

The security detection mechanisms may be as simple as flagging a login failure, or be highly complex behavior pattern recognition. DICOM enables these mechanisms. DICOM does not specify them.

*Slide Provided by Eric Pan, Agfa HealthCare*

## Certificate Management

- Certificates are used to identify systems (and perhaps Application Entities)
- Certificates can be self-generated, facility signed, or signed by internationally recognized authorities.

## Most equipment supports

- Individually provided certificates per system (self-signed or otherwise), and
- Certificates for facility authorities. Certificates signed by these authorities are recognized as authorized.

## Management reference

- The SPC paper “Managing Certificates” describes this in more detail.

## Firewall rules

- **Firewalls may need to be configured to permit DICOM over TLS traffic (in and out).**
  - The DICOM over TLS port defaults to the same port as HTTPS, but it is often changed.
  - Using a different port permits the same system to be both an HTTPS server and a DICOM over TLS system.

## Audit Policies

- **DICOM makes no specific recommendations on how the DICOM audit logs should be analyzed.**
- **The audit logs are designed to support surveillance for unauthorized activity. Other more detailed system specific logs are expected to provide forensic detail.**

# References



<http://dicom.nema.org/>



<http://www.HL7.org/>



<http://www.IHE.net/>

## **Lawrence Tarbox, Ph.D.**

- **tarboxl@mir.wustl.edu**
- **510 South Kingshighway Boulevard  
St. Louis, MO 63110 USA**

***Thank you for your attention !***